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In humans, the capacity for economically rational choice is constrained by a variety of preference
biases: humans evaluate gambles relative to arbitrary reference points; weigh losses heavier than
equally sized gains; and demand a higher price for owned goods than for equally preferred goods that
are not yet owned. To date, however, fewer studies have examined the origins of these biases. Here,
we review previous work demonstrating that human economic biases such as loss aversion and
reference dependence are shared with an ancestrally related New World primate, the capuchin
monkey (Cebus apella). We then examine whether capuchins display an endowment effect in a token-
trading task. We identiﬁed pairs of treats (fruit discs versus cereal chunks) that were equally preferred
by each monkey. When given a chance to trade away their owned fruit discs to obtain the equally
valued cereal chunks (or vice versa), however, monkeys required a far greater compensation than the
equally preferred treat. We show that these effects are not due to transaction costs or timing issues.
These data suggest that biased preferences rely on cognitive systems that are more evolutionarily
ancient than previously thought—and that common evolutionary ancestry shared by humans and
capuchins may account for the occurrence of the endowment effect in both species.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economists have classically assumed that human
decision makers are well-designed rational actors,
equipped with neural mechanisms and cognitive
strategies that allow them to act in ways that maximize
their expected utility. This traditional view of humans as
rational strategists, however, comes into conﬂict with
agrowingconsensusamongsocialscientiststhathumans
consistently behave in ways that are systematically
inconsistent with their own rational self-interest.
In situations as diverse as judging the quality of cash
gambles or deciding between risky and safe alternatives,
people regularly violate the tenets of rational choice
theory, often basing their preferences on a variety of
arbitrary factors that matter little for the decision at
hand (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986). A number of
classic studies have demonstrated that human decision
makers weigh losses more strongly than equally sized
gains (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). In addition, when
a decision between a safe and risky gain is reframed as a
decision between a safe and risky loss, people’s
preferences shift dramatically from being risk-averse to
risk-seeking (Tversky & Kahneman 1986).
Another famous demonstration of our irrational
decision-making strategies is the phenomenon termed
the endowment effect—the tendency of human
decision makers to systematically overvalue objects
that they own over objects that they do not yet own. In
one of the most famous demonstrations of this effect,
Kahneman et al. (1990) gave human participants a new
object (e.g. a mug) and then offered them the chance
to sell this object or trade it for an equally priced
alternative good (e.g. a set of pens). Kahneman and
colleagues observed that participants consistently
refuse to trade their owned object and demanded
approximately twice as much money to sell the object
as buyers were willing to pay to obtain the object. As
this and many other similar studies have demonstrated
(Kahneman et al.1 9 9 1 ), human decision makers
appear to value an object differently after they have
become its owner. Since these initial studies, the
endowment effect has standardly been observed in a
variety of situations, both in the laboratory and in the
ﬁeld (e.g. Thaler 1980; Kahneman et al. 1991; Johnson
et al. 1993; Franciosi et al. 1996).
(a) The origins of the endowment effect and
other economic biases
Economists commonly consider the endowment
effect and other behavioural biases to be violations of
standard rational choice theory. In the case of the
endowmenteffect, for example, rational decision makers
should be indifferent between keeping the item they
currently have and swapping it for an equally valued
item. Nevertheless, real decision-makers’ preferences
appear to be heavily inﬂuenced byownership in a variety
of situations. In addition, the endowment effect (and
possibly other behavioural biases, see Santos &
Lakshminarayanan 2008) appears to emerge in the
absence of much experience. Harbaugh et al.( 2 0 0 1 )
were the ﬁrst to explore whether children also place a
higher value on objects theyown over objects theydonot
y e to w n .T h e ye n d o w e d6 - ,8 -a n d1 0 - y e a r - o l dc h i l d r e n
with a toy and allowed them to trade the toy
for an alternative toy that was equal in value. Children
s h o w e da ne n d o w m e n te f f e c tj u s ta sa d u l tp a r t i c i p a n t s
(e.g. Kahneman et al. 1990); they were reluctant to
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alternative. This study and others suggest that behavio-
ural biases such as the endowment of effect can emerge
in the absence of much market experience.
The pervasiveness and early emergence of the
endowment effect and other biases provide hints that
these strategies may be far more basic to human
cognition than these biases are often considered.
Indeed, the prevalence of at least some of these biases
in market-inexperienced children (e.g. Harbaugh et al.
2001) suggests that cultural learning and market
experience may play relatively little role in the
development of these biases. Instead, the early
emergence of these behavioural biases hints that more
basic cognitive mechanisms might be involved, and
that the cognitive architecture giving rise to these
mechanisms may be phylogenetically older than
previously suspected.
(b) A new methodological approach: an
evolutionary examination of behavioural biases
Our work seeks to address this possibility more directly.
To do so, we have begun exploring the evolutionary
history of our behavioural biases using a comparative
approach. Speciﬁcally, over the past few years, we have
begun examining the extent to which our human
behavioural biases are shared with our closest living
evolutionary relatives—the extant non-human primates
(e.g. Santos & Lakshminarayanan 2008; Chen et al.
2006). Our work has focused on one model species—
the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), which is a
common non-human primate model of human cogni-
tion (e.g. Fragaszy et al. 2004).
The broad goal of our research was to examine the
nature of capuchin monkeys’ economic strategies in
contexts that were similar to those used in human
studies. Unfortunately, most human studies present
participants with gambles involving monetary pay-offs,
rewards not typically used with non-human subjects.
To get around this issue, we developed a form of
‘monetary’ gamble that our capuchin subjects could
understand. We (Chen et al. 2006) ﬁrst taught our
capuchins that they could exchange small metal tokens
with human experimenters for pieces of food. A
number of primate species have successfully learned
to exchange tokens in this way (e.g. Westergaard et al.
1998, 2004; Liv et al. 1999; Brosnan & de Waal 2003,
2004), and not surprisingly, our monkeys learned to
exchange tokens with relatively minimal training. We
then placed our newly trained capuchins into an
economic market, one in which the monkeys could
choose between different human traders offering
different kinds of goods at different prices. At
the beginning of each session, each monkey subject
began with a small ‘wallet’ of tokens and entered the
market where two different experimenters offered
different goods at different prices. The experimenters
showed the monkey what kind and amount offood they
were offering for a single token, and the monkey
could then choose to trade with whomever it chose.
We could then measure each monkey’s preferences
in terms of the percentage of tokens they traded with
each of the experimenters.
We ﬁrst used this token-trading set-up to explore
whether capuchins behave broadly rationally in this
new economic market. To do this, we presented
monkeys with a choice between traders who offered
two different kinds of food that the monkeys liked
equally, e.g. apple slices and grapes. When presented
with this choice, our capuchins traders spent about half
of their tokens on apples and half on grapes. We then
introduced a compensated price shift, basically putting
one of the goods, say apples, on sale by providing
double the quantity for a single token. Our monkeys
bought more of the cheaper food when it went on sale,
behaving rationally as a human consumer would to this
shift in the prices. We then examined whether the
capuchins prefer a trading option that weakly dom-
inates, or more speciﬁcally, one that provides the most
food overall. We presented the monkeys with a choice
between one experimenter who always offered (and
gave) one piece of apple, and a second experimenter
who always offered two pieces of apple but half the time
gave one piece, and half the time gave two. Note that
this second trader was a risky choice, but he on average
gave one and half pieces of apple which was a better
deal than the certain one piece of apple offered by the
ﬁrst experimenter. When faced with this choice, the
capuchins preferred to trade with the second
experimenter, again choosing the option that allowed
them to make the most of their token budget (Chen
et al. 2006).
These results demonstrate a few important features
of our capuchin market. First and most importantly,
the capuchins seem to understand the market we have
created for them; with little training, our capuchins
were able to pick up information about each trader’s
past behaviour and use that information to make
informed choices in the market. Second, our monkeys
appear to behave rationally in the market, selectively
trading with experimenters who offer them a better
deal. Put in more economic terms, our capuchins prefer
options that stochastically dominate, ones that tend to
give them more food overall. In addition, our capuchins
reliably shift their consumption to the cheaper good
when the prices change, just as humans do.
Having established that capuchins behave broadly
rationally in some aspects of this market, we went on to
examine whether capuchins display the heuristics that
humans do—namely, reference dependence and loss
aversion. In our ﬁrst study, we presented capuchins
with a choice between two traders who gave the same
amount of food, either one or two pieces of apple. The
ﬁrst trader, however, gave food by way of a perceived
gain. This trader started out by showing the monkey
only one piece of apple but when paid gave an
additional second piece of apple half the time. The
second trader offered the same amount of food by way
of a perceived loss. This second trader started out by
displaying two pieces of apple but when paid took
one of the pieces of apple away half the time. Although
the two traders offered the same amount of food on
average, our capuchin subjects did not treat them
equally. Instead, our monkeys signiﬁcantly preferred
to trade with the experimenter who gave a perceived
gain over the one who gave a perceived loss.
Interestingly, the monkeys behaved much like human
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(e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986)—theyevaluate
their choices in terms of an arbitrary reference point,
namely the initial amount offood that they were shown.
We then went on to examine whether capuchins
showed this pattern because they were seeking out
perceived gains or whether they were instead avoiding
perceived losses. Monkeys were given a choice between
one trader who always showed one piece of apple and
delivered that piece and second experimenter who
always showed two pieces of apple but delivered only a
single piece. Again, even though both experimenters
gave the same pay-off, our capuchins reliably avoided
the experimenter who gave less than what he initially
offered, suggesting that capuchins, like humans, are
averse to losses.
These results suggest that, despite their obedience to
rational price theoretic predictions, capuchins appear
to exhibit the same systematic behavioural biases that
humans display. Capuchins avoided trading with
experimenters who gave them perceived losses (i.e.
capuchins demonstrated loss aversion) and preferred to
trade more with experimenters whose ﬁnal food
offering was more than the initially displayed amount
of food (i.e. capuchins demonstrated reference depen-
dence). Capuchin monkeys thus appear to share a
number of the systematic biases that humans demon-
strate, suggesting the possibility that these biased
strategies may have been shared by a common ancestor
between humans and capuchins and thus could have
emerged over 30 million years ago.
(c) The present studies: an endowment effect
in non-human primates?
Here, we report a new set of studies aimed at
investigating whether capuchins share another of
humans’ irrational tendencies. Speciﬁcally, we examine
the extent to which this ancestrally related primate
species exhibits a bias analogous to the endowment
effect. In contrast to the other behavioural biases
previously observed in capuchins, there is reason
to suspect that the endowment effect is unique to
humans. Speciﬁcally, social scientists commonly view
the endowment effect as resulting from either a concept
of ‘ownership’—a sophisticated notion that one can or
should hold exclusive control over an object or good
(see Kahneman et al. 1991; Beggan 1992; Franciosi
et al. 1996)—or a rich self concept. Considering an
endowment effect from this perspective, it is might
seem unlikely that non-human primates might share
this bias (but see Hauser 2000). By contrast, other
researchers have hypothesized that the endowment
effect results from a simpler process, perhaps simply as
a result of loss aversion (e.g. Kahnehman et al. 1990).
From this perspective, one might predict that species
demonstrating loss aversion would also be likely to
exhibit an endowment effect.
A recent report by Brosnan and colleagues
provides strong hints that at least one primate species,
the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), exhibits an endow-
ment-like effect in a trading paradigm. Speciﬁcally,
Brosnan et al. (2007) presented chimpanzees with
either a piece of food or a toy and then allowed
chimpanzees to trade this object for a different
but slightly more preferred object. Although most
chimpanzees readily exchanged toys for equivalent
toys, a reliable number of chimpanzees were reluctant
to trade their endowed pieces of food for other
slightly preferred foods. In this way, chimpanzees
appear to exhibit a behaviour analogous to a human
endowment effect, at least when endowed with food
as opposed to non-food items.
Brosnan and colleagues have provided the best
evidence to date that at least a closely related non-
human primate exhibits an endowment effect. Unfor-
tunately, however, their results are open to at least
two deﬂationary alternative explanations. The ﬁrst
interpretation concerns the possibility that chimpan-
zees’ unwillingness to trade their endowed food items
may have resulted from the cost of trading the food. It is
possible that chimpanzees may be averse to trading
rather than eating their endowed food simply because
the act of trading involves a certain amount of effort (or
what economists might call a transaction cost).
Consequently, it is possible that chimpanzees refused
to trade with experimenters not owing to an endow-
ment effect per se, but instead because they were averse
to the additional effort associated with approaching the
experimenter and trading the food. A second similar
alternative account involves the extra time it takes to
trade as opposed to eat the endowed food. Although
chimpanzees are known to delay gratiﬁcation in some
circumstances (e.g. Rosati et al. 2007), they still may be
r e l u c t a n tt ow a i tf o rf o o dw h e na n o t h e rf o o di s
immediately available. If chimpanzees were reluctant
to wait to obtain the traded food, then the bias towards
keeping the endowed food observed in this task may be
due more to the delay associated with trading the food
than to an endowment effect per se.
The goals of our study were threefold. First, we
wished to build on the work of Brosnan and colleagues
and account for possible deﬂationary interpretations of
these previous ﬁndings in chimpanzees. Speciﬁcally, we
aimed to examine whether a similar endowment effect
would emerge when primate subjects were adequately
compensated for both timing issues and transaction
costs. Second, we wanted to explore the endowment
effect in an even more distantly related primate species,
o n et h a ts h a r e da ne v e nm o r ea n c i e n tc o m m o n
ancestor with humans. For this reason, we focused on
the brown capuchin, which shared a common
evolutionary ancestor with humans over 30 million
years ago (Fragaszy et al. 2004) and is therefore more
distantly related to humans than chimpanzees, a
species whose common ancestor split from our species’
lineage only 6 million years ago (Tomasello 1999).
Finally, we wanted to demonstrate the existence of an
endowment effect with a primate population that is
known to exhibit rational market behaviour at least
in some circumstances. Chen et al. (2006) previously
demonstrated that brown capuchins exhibit very
sophisticated, economically rational behaviour in a
token exchange market. The capuchins in Chen et al.’s
study rationally shifted their trading preferences
depending on the difference in the quality of the
rewards offered by experimenters, obeying standard
price theoretic models just as humans do. This
population’s rational market performance in a trading
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which to test for an irrational bias such as the
endowment effect since this populations’ previous
performance indicates that they can behave rationally
in some market contexts—they rationally respond to
price cuts, re-budget tokens towards cheaper goods in
a way that is well described by rational maximizer
models, etc.
With these goals in mind, we presented the same
capuchin monkeys previously tested by Chen et al.
(2006) with a situation analogous to the experimental
markets in which humans demonstrate the endowment
effect (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1991). Our method,
however, capitalizes on the same market task in which
this population previously exhibited rational behavi-
our, a token-trading task (ﬁgure 1). We ﬁrst show that
capuchins exhibit an endowment effect in this trading
market, and then attempt to rule out three separate
alternative explanations for this effect.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Subjects
We tested ﬁve adult capuchins—two males (NN and
FL) and three females (HG, MD and JM), all of whom
had previously participated in token-trading experi-
ments (Chen et al. 2006). All monkeys had ad libitum
access to water and were fed a daily food allotment of
monkey chow and fruit in the mornings and evenings.
(b) Apparatus
Subjects were tested in a cubic wire mesh-trading
chamber (each side: 83!83 cm) elevated approxi-
mately 75 cm and attached to their main home
enclosure. The walls on the left and right side of the
trading chamber had two openings (5 cm high!8c m
long), such that monkeys could reach through only one
side of the box at each time. For each condition, traded
objects consisted of either a 2.5 cm metal disc (here-
after, the token) or a food reward. Food rewards
included fruit discs (approx. 3 cm in diameter), cereal
cubes (1.25 cm cubes of mini-wheat cereal), or a
1.25 cm!0.64 cm slice of marshmallow ﬂuff-ﬁlled
fruit roll-up (hereafter, FFRU). Experimental sessions
were videotaped with a Sony digital-8 videocamera.
(c) General procedure
Each subject began with a baseline session. At the
beginning of this session, 12 tokens were placed in
the trading chamber. Subjects were then allowed to
enter the trading chamber and could use the tokens
to purchase rewards by placing a token into the
hand of one of the two experimenters (E1 and E2
wearing different colours). To begin each trial, the
experimenters positioned themselves on opposite sides
of a trading chamber and prepared to trade, leaving one
hand open and partially extended into the enclosure to
receive a token, and with the other displaying a dish
with a food reward within the sight of the subject, but
out of its reach. During the baseline session, one
experimenter offered a fruit disc while the other offered
a chunk of cereal. The monkey was then allowed to
choose one experimenter by reaching through the
opening with its token and presenting the token
into the chosen experimenter’s hand. The chosen
experimenter moved his dish of food reward within
reach of the subject. After each trade, experimenters
switched sides, and displayed their offers to begin a new
trial. Subjects completed 12 trials per session and thus
completed a session once they had spent their entire
budget of 12 tokens. If the subject exhibited a
preference for one of the two goods (i.e. chose to
consume either one of the goods for more than 7 of
these 12 trades, indicating a greater-than-chance
preference), then we changed the type of fruit and
cereal used, and reran preference testing until the
subject chose equally across the two presented goods.
After completing the baseline sessions, in which we
established the subjects’ indifference when choosing to
trade tokens for either good, subjects were moved to an
experimental session. The experimental session
(experiment 1) differed from the baseline sessions in
two key ways: ﬁrst, we replaced subjects’ tokens with
foods and, second, we presented only one experimenter
as a trading option to the subject. Subjects participated
in two experimental sessions: one in which they were
endowed with fruit discs and could trade with an
experimenter offering cereal, and one in which they
were endowed with cereal and could trade with an
experimenter offering fruit discs. Before running the
ﬁrst experimental session of each condition, subjects
each performed one additional familiarization session
with the new single trader. During these familiarization
trials, the single experimenter wore the same colour
and delivered the same rewards as in the experimental
sessions. In this familiarization session, however,
subjects were endowed with four tokens and could
trade these with the experimenter who offered one of
the two kinds offoods (either cereal or fruit, depending
on the condition). This session served to familiarize the
subject with the behaviour of this trader.
After this familiarization session, subjects were
tested on two experimental sessions in which they
were endowed with food instead of tokens. Subjects
then had 12 trials in which they were endowed with one
kind of food and had a choice between eating the
endowed food objects or trading them for the offered
equivalent (e.g. endowed fruit disc could be traded for
the offered cereal cube, and the endowed cereal cube
could be traded for the offered fruit disc). Thus, the
Figure 1. A photograph depicting the token exchange method
in capuchins. Here, one capuchin subject, Auric, trades a
token for a food reward.
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endowed good as it saw ﬁt, and trade the remainder
to the experimenter for the other type of good. Subjects
ran one session of 12 trials in which they were endowed
with cereal and were offered fruit, and another session
of 12 trials in which they were endowed with fruit and
offered cereal.
In experiment 2, we examined whether subjects
understood that food rewards could be traded. To look
at this, we examined whether subjects would trade the
endowed cereal or fruit for a more highly valued food
item. Experiment 2 used the same experimental set-up
as experiment 1, but instead of offering an equiva-
lent good in exchange for the endowed good, the
experimenter offered a highly valued treat, an FFRU.
Subjects again ran one session of 12 trials in which they
were endowed with cereal and offered FFRU, and
another session of 12 trials in which they were endowed
with fruit and offered FFRU.
Experiment 3 examined whether subjects would
continue to show an endowment effect after they had
been compensated for the cost of transacting the trade.
Experiment 3 presented subjects with a choice between
eating their endowed food objects and trading them for
the equivalent food plus a small compensation for the
transaction cost of the trade. Before running experi-
ment 3, however, each subject was administered a
transaction cost assessment session to determine the
smallest compensation that the subject would accept
in exchange for a token. To determine this, each subject
was given 12 tokens just as in the baseline session, with
only one experimenter available to receive these tokens.
For the ﬁrst round of this transaction cost assessment,
the experimenter offered only one piece of uncooked
oatmeal (‘1 oat’) in exchange for each of the monkey’s
tokens. If subjects refused to trade any of their tokens
for just 1 oat, then the transaction cost assessment was
rerun with the experimenter now offering two pieces of
oats in exchange, and so on. In thisway, we were able to
determine the transaction cost (or minimal compen-
sation necessary for the delivery of the token) for each
subject. Experiment 3 then followed the exact
procedure of experiment 1, except that the reward
offered by the experimenter was increased by the
amount of the transaction cost of the trade. Subjects
ran one session of 12 trials in which they were endowed
with cereal and were offered fruit plus the oat transaction
cost, and another session of 12 trials in which they were
endowed with fruit and offered cereal plus the oat
transaction cost.
Experiment 4 explored whether subjects’ endow-
ment effect was due to temporal discounting problems.
In other words, did subjects really exhibit an endow-
ment effect or did they instead choose to keep rather
than trade the endowed food simply because it was
faster to eat the endowed food than to trade it for the
equivalent offered food. To get at this, we presented
subjects with a choice between eating an endowed
slow-to-eat food object (an almond inside of its shell) or
trading it for an equivalent good that was faster to eat
(an almond without a shell). Each subject was given 12
slow-to-eat almonds and allowed to trade with one
experimenter offering almonds without a shell. Sub-
jects could therefore choose to keep and eat the in-shell
almond, and endure the delay associated with opening
the nut or exchange it for a more quickly eaten almond
with no shell. In this way, we were able to determine
whether the capuchins’ tendency to keep the endowed
good remained even when the endowed good was
slower to eat than the offered good. Subjects ran a
single session of 12 trials in which they were endowed
with in-shell almonds and offered out-of-shell almonds.
3. RESULTS
(a) Baseline
In the baseline session, one experimenter offered a fruit
disc while the other offered a chunk of cereal. Subjects
received 12 tokens and could spend each on one of
these two food options. Subjects chose equally,
spending no more than 7 of their 12-token budget on
either of these options. Pooling across all ﬁve subjects,
monkeys chose cereal exactly as often as fruit, and
therefore chose neither option any greater than chance,
as conﬁrmed by a binomial probability test (pooled
proportion of choices to cereal: 50%, nZ60, pZ1.00,
see ﬁgure 2). This was conﬁrmed with follow-up
binomial probability tests for each of our ﬁve actors,
conﬁrming that no capuchin preferred cereal over fruit
in his or her baseline session (proportion of choices
to cereal—NN: 50%, nZ12, pZ1.00; HG: 58.33%,
nZ12, pZ0.774; MD: 58.33%, nZ12, pZ0.774;
FL: 41.66%, nZ12, pZ0.774; JM: 41.66%, nZ12,
pZ0.774). These baseline results conﬁrmed that we
had picked two goods of roughly equal value to our
subjects (i.e. subjects showed no robust preference
between the two goods).
(b) Experiment 1
Experiment 1 presented subjects with food items
in place of their 12 tokens and allowed subjects to
trade these food items back to an experimenter who
offered an equally preferred food item in exchange.
If ownership of these foods does not impact the value
that capuchins place on them, then monkeys should
consume the same ratio offruit discs to cereal, as in the
baseline. In contrast to this prediction, subjects
consumed far more of the fruit discs when they were
endowed with fruit discs and far more cereal
when endowed with cereal. When endowed with fruit
discs, subjects (pooled) spend only 1.7 per cent (nZ60)
of their budget on cereal, and when endowed with
cereal, spend only 15 per cent (nZ60) of their budget
on fruit. Both of these percentages are signiﬁcantly less
than 50 per cent (p!0.0001, two-tailed binomial
tests). All ﬁve subjects show this same pattern
individually. For all ﬁve subjects, we can reject
the null hypothesis that they prefer cereal and fruit
equally regardless of endowment; for all subjects
(individually), this is rejected in a two-sample test
of equality of proportions (Fisher’s exact probability
test) at the 0.1 per cent level for four of our ﬁve subjects
and at the 2 per cent level for the ﬁfth (HG).
(c) Experiment 2
To ensure that this pattern of results does not reﬂect
subjects’ unwillingness to use food as tokens, experi-
ment 2 presented subjects with sessions in which they
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of far greater value, the FFRU. We observed that
subjects had no trouble exchanging food for this higher
good, and ate signiﬁcantly less of the endowed
quantities when the FFRU was available in exchange.
Subjects traded away signiﬁcantly greater than half of
their endowed fruit discs or cereal for FFRU, trading
93.3 per cent (nZ60) and 81.67 per cent (nZ60) of
the time, respectively. Both of these percentages are
signiﬁcantly more than 50 per cent (p!0.0001, two-
tailed binomial tests). All ﬁve subjects show this same
pattern individually, trading signiﬁcantly more than
50 per cent of the time for FFRU. This is signiﬁcant for
all ﬁve subjects at the 5 per cent level in a two-tailed
binomial test when they were endowed with fruit and
for four of our ﬁve subjects when they were endowed
with cereal.
(d) Experiment 3
Experiment 3 then addressed a second alternative for
the endowment effect exhibited in experiment 1:
monkeys may be reluctant to trade their endowed
food due to the cost of transporting the endowed food
to the experimenter for exchange. To address this
transaction cost alternative, we ﬁrst estimated the
transaction cost of trading. Endowing subjects with
tokens as in the baseline test, wegradually increased the
exchange value until subjects chose to trade rather than
keep their tokens. We observed that all subjects were
willing to trade a token for a single oat. This quantity of
oats (nZ1), then, served as an estimate of the
‘transaction cost’—that is, the compensation it would
take to induce a capuchin subject to engage in the
trade. We then reran exactly our earlier two endowment
conditions, but offered subjects not only equivalent
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subjects (nZ6 0f o re a c hb a r ) .E r r o rb a r sr e p r e s e n t1s . e .I ne x p e r i m e n t1 ,w h e ns u j e c t sc o u l dt r a d ea ne n d o w e dg o o df o r
its equivalent, subjects preferred the endowed good over the good available through trade. This preference to consume
endowed food, rather than exchange it for an equivalent, persisted despite increasing the size of the offer to account for
the cost of the transaction (experiment 3) and the time of the trade (experiment 4). However, subjects were willing to
trade food in exchange for a highly valued alternative (experiment 2). Grey bars, cereal; white bars, fruit; dotted bar,
in-shell nut.
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offer them an oat in compensation for the effort of
completing the trade. We replicated the initially
reported pattern of results and found that subjects
still prefer more of the endowed good, even if they
are compensated for the effort of trading.
Just as in experiment 1, subjects (pooled) traded less
than 50 per cent of their budget of endowed food for
an equally attractive food (plus a single oat). When
endowed with fruit discs, monkeys traded only 5
per cent of the time (nZ60) and, when endowed with
cereal, traded only 21.7 per cent of the time (nZ60).
Both of these percentages are signiﬁcantly less than 50
per cent (p!0.0001, two-tailed binomial test). This
pattern holds across all subjects; all ﬁve subjects traded
less than 50 per cent of their endowed foods when they
could exchange these for the equally attractive food
(plus one oat). This is signiﬁcant for all ﬁve subjects at
the 5 per cent level in a two-tailed binomial test.
(e) Experiment 4
Finally, experiment 4 explored another alternative,
namely that subjects exhibit an endowment effect in
experiment 1 simply because trading takes more time
than eating the food. To get at this, we presented
subjects with the option to trade a slow-to-eat almond
inside its shell for a more quickly eaten almond outside
its shell. Just as in experiments 1 and 3, subjects traded
less than half of their endowment for an option that
took less time to eat, in this case, an out-of-shell
almond. Given a total of 60 in-shell almonds, which
could either be eaten or traded for out-of-shell
almonds, subjects (pooled) traded only 23.33 per
cent of the time. This is signiﬁcantly less than 50
per cent (p!0.0001, nZ60, two-tailed binomial test).
These results were conﬁrmed by follow-up tests
conducted for each subject. Four of our ﬁve subjects
traded less than 50 per cent of their endowed in-shell
almonds when they could exchange these for more
quickly eaten out-of-shell almonds. NN traded 0 per
cent of his endowment of in-shell almonds (nZ12).
HG also traded 0 per cent of her endowment (nZ12).
FL and MD each traded 8.3 per cent of their
endowments (nZ12 for each monkey). These four
subjects each trade signiﬁcantly less than 50 per cent of
the time for the more quickly eaten option (p!0.01,
two-tailed binomial tests). An additional monkey, JM,
showed the opposite pattern, trading 100 per cent of
her endowed in-shell almonds (nZ12).
4. DISCUSSION
Like humans (Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991), our
capuchin participants are reluctant to trade food that
they own for equally preferred foods. When tested in
experiment 1, capuchins preferred to eat fruit discs
when they were made owners of fruit discs, but
preferred to eat cereal pieces when they were made
owners of these objects instead. Monkeys’ willingness to
sell an item appears to be less than their willingness
to buy an identical item. As with previous effects
reported in chimpanzees (Brosnan et al. 2007), the
endowment effect we observe cannot be merely due to
an inability to trade food rewards—monkeys tested
in experiment 2, readily traded their endowed food
object when offered a more valuable food item
in exchange. In contrast to previous work in chimpan-
zees, however, our results cannot be explained with
deﬂationary alternative accounts involving trans-
action costs and timing effects. Our capuchins subjects
continue to exhibit an endowment effect in experi-
ments 3 and 4, even when they are compensated for
the time and cost of the transaction. Taken together
with Brosnan and colleagues’ similar ﬁndings in
chimpanzees, our results suggest that the bias to over-
value owned objects is not unique to humans. Indeed,
this bias appears to be shared with a species who
shared a common ancestor with humans over 30
million years ago.
The present results ﬁt with a growing body of work
suggesting that many of our own species behavioural
biases—reference dependence (Chen et al. 2006), loss
aversion (Santos & Lakshminarayanan 2008) and now
the endowment effect—appear to be shared with other
primate species, even those that are distantly related in
evolutionary time. Such ﬁndings suggest that at least
some behavioural biases may not emerge as a result of
speciﬁc economic experiences and market disciplin-
ing—instead, our human systematic biases might be
the result of evolved cognitive strategies, ones present
in our primate lineage for considerable phylogenetic
time. Our work further provides some constraints on
the cognitive and neural mechanisms that may underlie
these biases in the human species. Speciﬁcally, our
observation that non-linguistic species share human
behavioural biases suggests that these heuristics cannot
rely on language or linguistic processing. In addition,
our ﬁndings hint that such biases cannot be due to
complex or uniquely human cognitive capacities, such
as a rich sense of self or an explicit notion of ownership.
The possibility that the endowment effect and other
behavioural biases result from evolved cognitive
strategies raises the question of why these strategies
evolved in the ﬁrst place, and what they might
ultimately be for. Economists typically consider
behavioural biases such as the endowment effect and
loss aversion to be irrational, namely they involve
choices and preference reversals that would not be
predicted by the tenets of standard utility maximiza-
tion. The presence of these biases in distantly related
primates, however, suggests that such strategies have
existed for some evolutionary time, raising the
possibility that they might serve some ultimate use
(e.g. Gigerenzer & Todd 1999 and Gigerenzer & Selton
2001 for a similar logic about the evolutionary
usefulness of purportedly irrational strategies). Our
results suggest that researchers should further investi-
gate how and in what circumstances the endowment
effect could be evolutionarily useful (see Beggan
1992 and Santos & Lakshminarayanan 2008 for a
similar discussion).
Finally, the growing body of work demonstrating the
endowment effect in distantly related primates high-
lights an opportunity for a more rigorous study of the
neural basis of these biases. Currently, much work in
human neuroscience has begun exploring the neural
underpinnings of loss aversion, the endowment
effect and other related behavioural biases (de Martino
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performed to date, however, has used functional
imaging techniques. Although such techniques have
already provided tremendous insight into the neural
basis of loss aversion and related biases, such
techniques are often the most insightful when used in
conjunction with animal-based physiological tech-
niques. Todate,littleworkhasaddressedtheendowment
effectand other behavioural biases from a neurophysio-
logical perspective in large part because it was unclear
that these biases could be observed in a primate
behavioural model. Our work suggests that one could
easily develop a monkey model of the endowment effect
and thus could develop a primate model for examining
the nature of ownership and value at the neural level.
The present study therefore paves the way for a
neurophysiological investigation of the endowment
effect, with the possibility of studying the effect
of ownership on value at the level of single neurons.
We thus hope that the present work adds both to our
understanding of the evolutionary nature of the
endowment effect and related biases, as well as to
the future of our knowledge of the neural basis of these
phenomena.
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